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Abstract 
Catastrophes are a powerful breakdown of our normative world, due to how they affect legal systems as 
jurisgenerative forces and the negation of law they produce at the same time. In this article I discuss the 
theoretical impact that the concept of catastrophe has on legal systems. To do so I focus on the 
strategies of response to the consequences of catastrophes enforced by the legal systems, exploring 
tensions between regulatory approaches and the guarantee of fundamental rights. In the second part of 
the article I assess the theoretical framework developed by connecting crime scenes to the idea of 
catastrophe. The analysis is conducted with reference to different cases such as the Bhopal disaster, the 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean, hurricane Katrina and a particular case of man-made and criminal 
catastrophe, the extensive toxic waste devastation caused by criminal organisations in the area of 
Naples, in Southern Italy. These cases show the links between environmental disasters, the inefficiency of 
law and the massive devastation of an entire area, which leads to different kinds of crime scenes from 
those normally evaluated, for their source, their physical extensions and for the enormous impact they 
had on local communities. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol13/iss1/7 
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Catastrophes as Crime Scenes: 
Analysing the Legal Context
Valerio Nitrato Izzo
Introduction
Catastrophes have a strong conceptual link with modernity, even if 
this is rarely remembered. Surprisingly, we can also trace a date for the 
first general recognition of the importance of this issue, at least in the 
western world. It was during the aftermath of the Lisbon earthquake 
in 1755 that thinkers started questioning catastrophe. The immense 
devastation caused by the earthquake, in a big and wealthy city such 
as Lisbon in that period, caused an enormous impression and different 
reactions concerning its origins. Two of the most important thinkers of 
the time, Voltaire and Rousseau, directly considered the topic, but with 
different approaches. Voltaire vigorously attacked the idea according 
to which the world was assumed to be good because, as claimed by 
Leibniz, it was the creation of God. He insisted on the contradictory 
widespread presence of such evil and harmful events in a world 
supposed to be good. On the one hand, Voltaire was lamenting the 
fate of humanity suffering from the evil face of Nature, underlining the 
difficulty of understanding the nature of evil. On the other, Rousseau 
insisted on the human attitudes that call for responsibility in the 
outcomes of the events, focusing on the part played by the social and 
cultural context in an event out of human control.
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Here lies the challenge that the concept of catastrophe still poses 
to us today, and probably more than ever. Rousseau’s view can be 
considered to pioneer a modern social science approach to the topic 
of catastrophes, for he acknowledged the role of the emerging nation 
state as the main social actor in charge of a response to disastrous 
consequences (Dyne 2000).
However, we can try to clarify the meaning of catastrophe 
by emphasising its strong connection to the normative world. 
Notwithstanding the fact that ‘law and catastrophe’ is a very recent 
topic, it is common to find reference to law in disaster literature, 
underlining the tautology implied in some legal definitions of disaster 
as that which the intervention of disaster relief units make necessary 
(Dombrowsky 1998: 14). The connection that recurs most of the time 
is the one between catastrophe and order, which can also be found 
in many definitions provided by international organisations such as 
the OECD or by UN bodies. In this sense, catastrophe is an event 
producing a subversion of the very concept of order itself (Douglas et 
al 2007: 2). Religious thought considered catastrophe issuing from law 
as an expression of normativity, sometimes in the sense of punishment.1 
The liberal approach underlines, instead, that it is law that arises 
from catastrophe and focuses on catastrophe as a breakdown of the 
normative world. Confronting the law, catastrophe is Janus-faced, 
juris-generative and antithetic to law, all at the same time (Douglas 
et al 2007: 4). Catastrophes are moments when we confront the limits 
of our normative world (Ross Meyer 2007: 20). In this article I will 
discuss the way law shapes, creates and sometimes destroys such limits 
when catastrophes happen. Public injustice, the responsibility of the 
State and the possibility of a ‘state of exception’ are features that can 
link catastrophes to crime scenes, as shown by the cases of Hurricane 
Katrina, the Bhopal industrial explosion and, especially, urban and 
toxic waste in Naples. Crime scenes that arise from such occurrences 
can enlighten not only the response of law and legal system in extreme 
events, but also the hidden logic and significance of the relationship 
between law, ‘crime scenes’ and the catastrophe.
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Catastrophic Risks
Those events defined as catastrophes always demand an urgent response 
from the legal system. For a better understanding and assessment of 
the impact of catastrophes on a legal system, a conceptual framework 
is required which links different elements such as regulatory techniques 
and normative approaches. Governmental policies use law as a means 
of assessing, reducing and controlling risk in a sovereign territory. It is 
the very concept of risk as something that can be controlled by human 
forces that recalls a normative meaning. Risk is a human creation, 
depending on its perception, which is always culturally influenced 
and, from this point of view, always relative to some extent, because 
perception of risk can vary not only among societies but also within a 
society (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).
Consequently, here stems an important question: what are the 
features that make catastrophic risks different from other kind of risks? 
Firstly, we should be aware of the fact that catastrophes challenge the 
reliability of common risk assessing methods. Due to features such 
as magnitude, uncertainty and possible irreversibility in outcomes, 
the actuarial and probabilistic approach, typical of the insurance 
companies, is weak when it must face effects that are not foreseeable. 
Each risk assessment is a matter of classification, and it simply cannot be 
possible without assigning values — in the broadest meaning — to the 
outcomes (Steele 2004: 25). Modernity and the scientific approach have 
always attempted to place everything under the umbrella of possible 
assessment via calculation. In the ‘risk society’, it is the creation and 
the distribution of risks in society that play a central role, but in a new 
context where risks are, more and more, non-reciprocal. Due to the 
complexity of the contemporary world, risk is not always under control 
and many social groups are affected by risks that they did not help 
create. The role of science is crucial here because it lies at the heart of 
the connection between risk evaluation and decision-making. Risk is 
not something ‘natural’ but it is always man-made; it is ‘manufactured’, 
as Giddens states, through the development of technology (1999: 4).
Modernity has brought us not only a deep faith in progress through 
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knowledge, but also a way of reasoning, theoretically well hidden, 
regarding the dangers of our era. What is distinctive of catastrophes 
is that we should always be aware of the possibility of the worst-case 
scenario. This is sometimes called ‘catastrophism’ in the negative sense. 
Catastrophes are events with a low probability of materialising but they 
can produce terrible destruction and harm. Therefore, trying to calculate 
risks by balancing security and action, using knowledge and technology, 
does not represent the whole range of problems that catastrophic risks 
pose. Beck (1992) has noted that it is not the probabilistic approach of 
science that can end the discussion on the issues of risk. Catastrophic 
risks are mainly perceived as potential risks that include elements not 
susceptible of exact scientific prevision (for example the impact of 
decisions on future generations). Here lies the imperfection of the world 
and the gap between scientific and social rationality (Beck 1992: 30).
According to Dupuy (2002), catastrophism can also be seen as a kind 
of metaphysics of the modern world. In our attempt to reduce, minimise 
and sometimes deny risk, there is a common view that assigns to total 
reduction of risk an inevitable abstention from action. Dupuy challenges 
this view, asserting that the worst-case scenario must be taken into 
consideration as a possible event and that to minimise catastrophic risk 
does not mean a risk degree equivalent to zero. Inverting the temporal 
order between possible production of the event and its taking into 
account, Dupuy warns us that:
What is terrible with catastrophes is that we do not believe it is going 
to happen, even if we have all the information about this possibility. 
Once it has happened it will be considered inside the normal order 
of things. Catastrophe is not judged possible before its coming into 
existence (Dupuy 2002: 84-85).2
For Dupuy, understanding catastrophe in an era in which technology 
has reached the point that its use could lead to the total self-destruction 
of humanity, needs this metaphysical clarification.
Until now, I have not distinguished between human-made and 
natural catastrophes. This distinction was clear at the time of Voltaire, 
but is no longer. Of course, it is possible to distinguish between an 
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atomic war, a terrorist attack, an earthquake, or a tsunami. These 
different catastrophic phenomena pose different problems and answers. 
However, from the point of view of the effects of the catastrophe, it 
is important to underline that there is not such a thing as a ‘natural 
catastrophe’: all catastrophes are social, due to their effects (Acot 2006). 
As acknowledged just after the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, 
this event could have been much less catastrophic with a simple and 
economic system of alerting people to the impending disaster.
With regard to crime, the element of human intention in the making 
of the catastrophe is evident, yet this aspect does not undermine the 
social nature of the catastrophe. The extreme degree of harm of such an 
event cannot be understood without reference to the failure of relevant 
legal systems that allowed a serious negligence or crime to turn into 
a catastrophe. This may be seen in the Bhopal and Naples cases that 
I discuss later.
Approaches to Law and Catastrophe
The topic of law and catastrophe is, surprisingly, quite a recent one with 
only a small body of literature that examines the topic from a general 
perspective. Recent events such as 9/11 and the general terrorist threat, 
the number of tsunamis and Hurricane Katrina, have had the effect of 
stirring a new interest in the topic, especially within North-American 
literature. Despite this, it is possible to ground some general points.
It has already been said that the immediate link between law and 
catastrophe is the call for response. This statement does not mean that 
law only comes into action when catastrophes have already happened. 
Quite the opposite, law must face the challenge of catastrophe first of 
all in the sense of establishing preventive strategies to avoid the harmful 
event. Regulatory strategies can be roughly divided into anticipation, 
prevention and amelioration (Douglas et al 2007: 6). Even if the 
distinction between these approaches is not always clear, because of 
the mutual influence between different regulatory strategies, it is useful 
to have an idea of legal regulatory efforts in different branches of law. 
113
Catastrophes as Crime Scenes
Anticipation and prevention seem to play the most important part. 
This is hardly surprising, as catastrophes have this distinctive feature 
of tremendous magnitude of harm if they happen, with subsequent 
amelioration strategies implemented only after bad outcomes have 
already occurred.
As the world of harm can be divided into criminal and civil wrongs, 
regulatory techniques, as general legal frameworks, try to classify 
extreme events into a kind of regulative grid typical of liberal legality 
(Douglas et al 2007: 15). Such an attempt reflects the distinctive 
features of different domains of law. Relevant regulatory strategies 
for anticipation, prevention and amelioration in civil law can include 
responses from a range of areas from administrative law to tort law, with 
the possibility of including a criminal law component. Enforcement of 
regulatory norms, norms of safety and infrastructural development are 
administrative law measures that fit into anticipation and prevention 
strategies. For as the focus of tort law on risk accomplishes a similar 
function to the assignment of corporate risk through the doctrines of 
foreseeability and strict liability, in the domain of criminal law the 
content of such strategies varies from anti-terrorism policies such as 
domestic spying, preventive detention, torture, to military strike and 
regime change in genocidal regimes.
In civil law, prevention and anticipation are usually taken into 
consideration under the form of foreseeability of harmful events and 
can be understood as an assignment of risk to the party that is going to 
act in a dangerous way. This is a more probabilistic way of reasoning, 
near to the insurance calculation of costs and trade-offs.
The logic of catastrophe is difficult to reduce to this, because of 
the immense and impossible costs of amelioration calculation (Posner 
2004).3 Massive disaster litigation shows that legal systems are capable 
of handling small or mid-size disasters but catastrophes in the larger 
sense — think about Bhopal — lead most judicial procedures to collapse 
or at least to show an important degree of inefficiency (Durkin and 
Felstiner 1994).
The main problem here is not the regulatory technique at stake. 
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From my point of view, the most important thing to understand is the 
link between social catastrophes and legal strategies to identify the 
accountable legal entity. My argument is that, notwithstanding the 
general emphasis on a cosmopolitan approach, the State still plays the 
biggest part in preventing harmful events from becoming catastrophes. 
A way to assess the argument is to analyse the importance of national 
legal systems in the criminalisation of catastrophes and in the 
management of crime scenes that arise from such events. Beck (2003) 
has argued that understanding and facing the challenges of a global 
risk society means to leave aside methodological nationalism in social 
sciences. His view implies that nation states are not able to face global 
risks acting independently anymore (Beck 2007). According to him, 
while authors like Luhmann, Douglas, or Foucault tend to focus on 
order as the main perspective, global risk leads us to a kind of imposed 
cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006). Whilst a discussion of the concept of 
cosmopolitanism and all its implications is beyond the purview of this 
article, I would like to underline some problems of this idea from the 
point of view of the role of law and State in a catastrophe.
The policies and the decisions of a State have a direct impact, and 
sometimes on the very ‘creation’ of a catastrophe when risks become 
real. We can say, for example, that some catastrophes, supposed to be 
natural, could have had a minor impact to a large extent. Hurricane 
Katrina is arguably the best example. The inertia of the civil protection 
system produced a clear demonstration of serious gaps in the ability of 
the legal system to respond to natural disasters and other catastrophic 
events (Chen 2009). The strategy was to ‘privatise’ risk, with the U.S. 
Government abdicating the most basic right since Hobbes: the right 
to life.4 This strategy had the effect of harming the most vulnerable 
people in New Orleans and the region affected by the devastation, 
prompting us to face the following question: is protection from harmful 
events of great magnitude a duty of the State? To understand that this 
is not just a matter of policy but also a question of rights, it is possible 
to think, in terms of a prevention regulatory approach, of the right to 
have an emergency plan provided by the local or national government 
(Binder 2002: 791) and that such a plan should be effectively enforced.5 
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Prevention in this way transforms itself from a regulatory practice into 
a right justiciable before a court, as claimed after the 2006 earthquake 
in Indonesia by Coalisi KPHY, an association of cause lawyers suing 
the Indonesian State for ‘having not arranged any prevention measure’ 
(Bultrini 2009).
My argument is that social vulnerability, from the legal point 
of view, is still, mostly, a matter of national systems rather than of 
international cooperation. The Bhopal case gives us some evidence of 
the conflict between cosmopolitan and national approaches. During the 
night of 2 and 3 December 1984 in Bhopal, India, a massive leak of the 
deadly gas methyl isocyanate occurred at the plant of pesticide producer 
Union Carbide. The accident resulted in the killing of several thousands 
of people among the local population. With its apocalyptic number 
of deaths, still rising in contemporary times due to the side effects of 
contamination, Bhopal is the largest industrial disaster that has ever 
occurred. It has also probably been one of the biggest crime scenes ever, 
if we regard this not exclusively from a penal liability standpoint but also 
in terms of a wide-spread and unbearable injustice. From the tragedy 
arose a long, complex, and still ongoing legal action that involved Union 
Carbide, the Indian government and the representatives of victims and 
survivors (see Cassels 1993). The case was the object of a long struggle 
trying to set liability and have the case heard by a competent judge in 
the US. The challenge for the victims was to assure a tort law system 
able to award a just compensation, given it was uncertain which was 
the best compensatory model: American or Indian. The case was, in the 
end, declared under Indian jurisdiction while the Indian government 
appointed itself as the victims’ exclusive representative. The Bhopal 
disaster’s judicial story contains two narratives: on one side, it shows 
that cosmopolitan approaches are limited and not always reliable from 
a victim’s perspective; and on the other side, that the performance 
of the legal national system is stressed by abnormal events and that 
law’s promises in this field can be quite elusive, especially in tort law 
(Galanter 2002).
This short summary of the argument should not be read as a call 
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for a return to a strict statualism. Assessing risk from a legal point 
of view surely goes beyond national borders. The development of the 
principle of precaution doctrine as a general principle of international 
law can be understood in this way, and not only for its origin in various 
international documents, but also for the  importance that it assumes 
in enforcing a particular legal view, more attentive to the element 
of prudence in legal theory (Papaux 2006: 220-240). Paradoxically, 
the precautionary principle can be offended by regulation as well as 
by non-regulation. Each regulation, including precautionary ones, 
involves worst-case scenarios of its own (Sunstein 2007: 128). Such 
scenarios, and the management of injustice they can bring, are still 
largely under the control of single legal systems, as the analysis of the 
Naples case shows.
Moral Journeys into the Land of Fires: The Evil 
that Men Do
During the last 15-20 years, an entire area of Southern Italy, Campania, 
the region having the city of Naples as administrative capital, has been 
tremendously devastated by illegal waste disposal. During this time, 
local bodies and the regional government did not succeed in organising 
a modern, efficient and ecological system of garbage management and 
disposal. The reasons for such a failure in the administrative system are 
complex and probably out of this article’s scope. In any case, and this 
is crucial for the analysis I develop here, the most important element 
is that the absolutely peculiar mix of inefficiency of the administrative 
and legal structures, and the role of criminal groups and local mafia — 
camorra — established a perennial emergency that, even if led by the 
national government through various legal acts, statutes and emergency 
decrees created, de facto, a legal context for a criminal catastrophe.
At this point a clarif ication is needed. Even if most people 
associate the Neapolitan trash crisis with the urban waste that filled 
the streets, due to the ample international media coverage, there are 
two emergencies that merge into one, even if they are just two faces 
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of the same phenomenon. The first one is related to the urban garbage 
issue, the fact that a complete cycle of garbage management was not 
functioning and is still generally not complete. The second is the toxic 
waste disposal directly led and organised by the camorra. The latter 
phenomenon is not what is generally expected of criminal organisations: 
we usually think about ‘classic’ crimes like international drugs traffic, 
exploitation of prostitution, rackets and so on. From this point of view 
the camorra was fairly far seeing: giving the word directly to the actors, 
a member of a camorra clan once stated during an interrogation that 
‘garbage is gold’ (Iacuelli 2008: 6, Commissione parlamentare 1997: 
426), meaning that the drug business was not the only way to make 
money.
Years of dumping illegal toxic waste, which was an economically 
convenient way of waste treatment for industries based in Northern 
Italy and across Europe, had passed without great social, environmental 
or political alarm. Paradoxically, the Italian Parliament was well aware 
of the situation, as demonstrated by official reports of parliamentary 
commissions and bodies of inquiry (see Commissione parlamentare 
1998, 2006). Unfortunately for the local population, the whole affair 
soon turned into a serious public health problem. The toxic waste, 
without complying with the strict national and EC regulations, had 
been mainly disposed of in illegal dumps, without any concern for 
environmental safety. Most of the time, due to the camorra’s power 
in terms of social relations and intimidating acts, toxic and industrial 
waste was buried in country fields. This practice turned out to be more 
profitable than agricultural pursuits. It is important to stress that the 
most affected area located north/north-east of the city of Naples was 
called Campania Felix [Prosperous Campania] by the Romans because 
of the extreme fertility of the area, renowned for its many local food 
products. As all this seems to have dramatically disappeared, due 
to a drop in demand for such products by frightened international 
markets, many authors now call the area Campania Infelix [Unprosperous 
Campania] (Iacuelli 2008: 1, Iovene 2008). Such massive environmental 
devastation slowly polluted the eco-system of the area, resulting in 
contamination of water resources and agricultural fields. As a direct 
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consequence, the area’s important role in agriculture began to be 
challenged, as many grazing animals such as sheep and buffalo started 
to get ill. This was due to high levels of dioxin, a highly toxic chemical 
compound, and other dangerous elements such as polychlorobiphenyls. 
Furthermore, dioxin is not only toxic for animals but also for humans, 
as it can cause cancer, malformations, leukaemia and lymphomas.
As strange as it may seem, for a long time the situation failed to gain 
media coverage even if the beginning of the spread of the dangerous 
effects was underway. Similarly, the public health authorities initially 
refused to link the increasing rates of disease, as a specific causal 
connection, with the toxic waste affair, also due to the lack of reliable 
data at a medical level. Things started to change when, in 2004, an 
article appeared in the prestigious scientific journal Lancet Oncology 
(Senior and Mazza 2004). In the title of the article appeared, for the 
first time, a sad way to refer to one of the areas most affected by illegal 
dumps: the ‘triangle of death’. The authors gave this term to an area that 
formed a triangle between the towns of Nola, Marigliano and Acerra, 
east of Naples. The study demonstrated, using empirical evidence, that 
in District 73, the public health code which indicated the area, during 
the period between 1994 and 2000 there was a significant rise of cancer 
rates. This was higher than the national and regional average, urging 
for an investigation into the link between the hazardous waste and 
cancer mortality (Senior and Mazza 2004: 527).
The hypothesis of the article established that the mortality of the 
sheep in Acerra was being affected by the toxic dumping. As toxic 
elements, especially dioxin, polluted pastures, the first victims of the 
disaster were the sheep breeding in the area. The sheep ended up being 
the first indicators of the disaster (Iovene 2008: 75), showing by their 
deaths the presence of an enormous concentration of dioxin in the feed 
and in the whole country-side of Acerra. Shepherds also began to die 
from the high average of dioxin in blood, and this happened in a zone 
without any significant industrial activity.6
This is only a brief review of a very intricate story. The removal of 
such a disaster from the public debate in Italy is probably due to a kind 
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of social schizophrenia mixed with a local and economic interest in not 
uncovering the veil of ignorance under which all of this was happening. 
Institutional reports and scientific studies did not become known to 
the public until the last urban waste crisis that affected Naples and its 
hinterland in 2007-2008. But, as we have seen, that was just one side 
of the Neapolitan garbage affair, and probably not the darkest one.
Where official reports did not succeed, literature did. In his widely 
acclaimed book Gomorrah, Roberto Saviano (2008) found the way to 
give a comprehensive description of the camorra’s criminal empire in 
its manifold manifestations. In the last chapter of the book, entitled 
‘Land of Fires’ (2008: 282), Saviano deals with the toxic waste affair. 
Magisterially reviewing what many of his compatriots tried not to see 
and hear, he made a descent to hell into the mechanisms and the minds 
that produced such a disaster, sweeping away the romantic image of 
the criminal attitude, showing the rising professionalism and the strict 
tie to the industrial and ‘official’ economic system. To generate such 
a massive flux of toxic waste in a one-way direction from northern to 
southern Italy means having contacts with an organised crime reality 
that, in order to have access to the rich market of illegal disposal, puts 
stakeholders and their technical competence in the first line to make 
business as profitable as possible (Saviano 2008: 288). In order to gain an 
accurate overview of the real dimensions of the business and its impact 
on disposal needs, there is no better way than to imagine a mountain 
with a base of three hectares, made of 14 million tons of unofficial and 
illegal trash with a height of 47,900 feet: the highest mountain on the 
planet (Saviano 2008: 283). But nobody is going to see this mountain 
as it is mainly underground and a substantial part of it is incinerated 
daily in this devastated land, as the title of the chapter suggests. The 
visual element results in an aesthetic of a catastrophe, with garbage 
fires all around, drums of toxic wastes left open in the country-side, 
urban waste left on the highways.7
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Figure 1. A Ferrillo ‘A toxic waste burning in the Land of Fires’ 
© Angelo Ferrillo <www.laterradeifuochi.it>
The legal framework that has regulated the garbage affair during 
the last fifteen years is an extremely complex one. In 1994, to counter 
the chronic inefficiency of the local bodies regarding garbage treatment 
and management, the Prime Minister declared an emergency state for 
waste management in the Campania Region that was based on Civil 
Protection intervention during natural disasters. This arose from the 
region’s proven inefficiency and the environmental emergency that it 
caused and was known as the Ordinanza del Presidente del Consiglio dei 
Ministri n.195 1994. This was the first legal act in a long series of acts 
that would set the legal framework of waste management for years to 
come (for a clear account and review of the legal framework’s evolution 
see Iannello 2007).
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The emergency writs that were issued year after year exploited the 
legal accountability of the local administrative bodies. The central 
government created a legal body called Commissariato per l ’emergenza 
dei rifiuti that, from 1996 onwards, would be the only legal institution 
to have authority on the subject. Unfortunately, this administrative law 
which was to be implemented as an emergency act for a limited time 
was still in force throughout the 2007 emergency. The constitutionality 
of these measures may be questioned because they became, once again, 
extended by Legge n. 123 2008 until December of 2009.
However, the original aim of simplifying the bureaucratic 
procedures in order to assist in the management of the public service 
ended with exactly the opposite result (Iannello 2007). In the end, 
the emergency became ordinary with all its possible and imaginable 
consequences. The exercise of emergency powers, free from any legally 
binding predetermination, did not solve the problem, but became a legal 
and administrative issue in itself. The various legal layers that were 
slowly added, ended up creating other bureaucratic structures, in which 
no one knew what the others were doing, with an enormous waste of 
public money, estimated at around two billion Euros. The most eloquent 
image is the five million balls of garbage (ecoballe) that are stored in the 
suburbs of Naples (Iacuelli 2008: 259). While they are there waiting 
to be burned in an incinerator, they are still owned by the company 
(Fibe-Impregilo) that was in charge of managing the whole process of 
garbage disposal. The economic aim of the company was to gain money 
from the incineration of such materials, in an industrial incinerator to 
be built by the same company. In the end, many public administrators 
— among which the President of the regional government, members 
and heads of the Commissariato per l ’Emergenza Rifiuti in Campania, 
members of the board of administration of the company Fibe and many 
others involved in the affair — were indicted before a Criminal Court.8 
So it was not only the illegal waste management that ended up being a 
criminal affair, but also an important part of the administrative action 
enforced under the emergency law.
122
Nitrato Izzo
Scenes From a Catastrophe
We can now focus on various aspects that highlight the link between the 
catastrophe as a theoretical concept and its legal and criminal context. 
What the Neapolitan story highlights well is that each catastrophe 
carries a double imperative: one is deeply linked with the idea of risk, 
mainly conceived as a general reflection on the probability of occurrence 
of the event, and the second concerns the policies to prevent it or 
weaken its social consequences. I would like, as an alternative, to follow 
a different direction that places catastrophe in a more general moral 
understanding of the event. What a catastrophe always brings is a break 
in the legal order. Each catastrophe produces such consequences on the 
legal systems that if the system cannot adequately respond, the social 
effects of a supposedly natural catastrophe will turn it into a moral one. 
This aims at a reconsideration in the legal context of the distinction 
between intentional and unintentional catastrophes. Of course, it is 
possible to distinguish between catastrophes such as Katrina, Bhopal or 
Naples. However, only in the last instance can we find a clear criminal 
intent that took place and that caused the catastrophe. But if it is true 
that there are no such things as natural catastrophes but only social 
ones, when we look at the consequences and social vulnerability (Chen 
2009: 4) the differences are less clear. In New Orleans, when the State 
failed to protect its citizens by giving them adequate assistance before 
and after the arrival of Hurricane Katrina, in the same way the national 
and local governments failed completely to prevent the daily crimes 
committed in that country. This shows that politics and law are closely 
bound up in the making of a catastrophe, and that from this point of 
view the same concept of foreseeability must be necessarily connected 
with the actions of institutions and governments.
Catastrophes are not only a challenge to the role law ordinarily 
plays in our societies, but they show the real effects of policy choices 
in a legal system. The most impressive thing about Katrina’s impact is 
the recognition that some individuals, belonging to identifiable classes 
and minorities, were not taken into consideration by the law and its 
institutions, as they were classified just as ‘without means to evacuate’, 
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without even asking who should have organised such means (Davis 
2005). We can consider such moments as comprising a tremendous 
legal epiphany in which, by stressing the limits of our normative world, 
we can more profoundly comprehend the way law really works or what 
goods and values it protects. That is, the poor and vulnerable in New 
Orleans were not perceived to be as deserving of the same level of 
protection from the catastrophe as others.
The schizophrenic attitude of law facing catastrophe is particularly 
well shown by the centrality of criminal law, instead of a legal paradigm 
focused on civil law and preventive practices. In the wake of Katrina, 
the absence of law was evident, as most vulnerable people lacked 
assistance. It seems a common feature among the cases of Katrina, 
Bhopal and Naples that the law abandoned victims to their fate, leaving 
them alone in a scenario which was out of their control. Nevertheless, 
in this situation law claimed indispensability in assuring order. The 
projection of traditional crime attitudes and biases regarding crimes 
committed during the catastrophe was initiated by introducing a false 
memory of crime related to the event (Simon 2007). A new model of 
disaster management emerged, centred on fusing natural elements such 
as floods or earthquakes with violent criminality and terrorism, with the 
risk of a growing amount of coercive law enforced by the State and local 
authorities (Simon 2007: 15). After its breaking impact on the legal 
system, the law tries to exploit and colonise catastrophe (Meyer 2007: 
21), trying to avoid recognition of the particularity of the situation. 
As the analysis of concepts such as looting during catastrophes seems 
to confirm (Green 2007), criminal law aims firstly at reaffirming the 
coercive power of the State as if the catastrophe had not happened, 
so that the law continues to operate normally, through ordinary legal 
categories, even in exceptional conditions, which the very same law 
helped create. The ‘shoot on sight’ order against looters shows the 
attempts of the law to reaffirm its authority, even in a time in which the 
law seems to have been depleted by events apparently out of its control.
The case of toxic waste in Naples is, nevertheless, slightly different 
from other catastrophes such as Katrina, the 2004 Tsunami or Bhopal. 
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The first objection that can be raised is that the toxic waste affair 
is anything but natural: that it should not be considered a natural 
catastrophe but rather an intentional one, in which the consequences 
were directly human-agency driven. I would like to argue that this 
point is not as relevant as it may seem at first sight. To do so I wish 
to introduce some distinctions between intentional and unintentional 
catastrophes. According to Posner it is possible to distinguish between 
catastrophes by classifying catastrophic risks in four classes, the fourth 
one regarding deliberately perpetrated catastrophes such as bio, cyber 
and technological terrorism, or nuclear winter (Posner 2004: 12). Other 
‘unintentional’ catastrophes which are man-made, are classified into 
a third category, comprising global warming, exhaustion of natural 
resources, loss of biodiversity and so on. Since Posner’s classification 
is designed to fit the cost-benefit analysis as the main assessment tool 
of catastrophic risk, he seems to regard natural catastrophes as not 
deeply influenced by human agency. This may be true for an asteroid 
collision, an extreme case in which there is probably not much sense 
in worrying about social vulnerability. But in all the other cases I 
think that cost-benefit analysis underestimates the aspect of social 
vulnerability as it focuses on the value we are willing to pay to avoid 
risk rather than the meaning in terms of impact these risks have in our 
lives, especially once they come, unfortunately, into existence. Similarly 
to Posner, Beck also distinguishes between intended and unintended 
catastrophes. The difference here lies in the fact that while side effect 
catastrophes, as unintended, are a mixture of bad and good (eg global 
warming), intentional ones (such as terrorist attacks) have no benefits 
(Beck 2009: 77). Even if Beck is aware of the fact that intended and 
unintended catastrophes can reinforce one another, the consequence, 
for him, is to stress the cosmopolitan dimension of the catastrophe, 
underlying the insufficiency of the national dimension. Putting the 
accent on social vulnerability means to be aware of the fact that, from 
a legal point of view, the State still plays a central role, and this is even 
clearer in a typical sovereign field such as criminal law.
That a certain criminal action is voluntary does not mean that we 
cannot frame such an action as a catastrophe. To do so, we should 
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consider another dimension of the catastrophe, that cannot be captured 
by cost-benefit analyses as it is impossible to assign an economic value 
to the moral dimension of justice. As Shklar (1990) has remarked, 
what is at stake in the relationship between citizens and catastrophes 
is the government’s answer to the threat posed by the event. Also, 
according to Shklar, the distinction between misfortune and injustice, 
more than a cultural one, is clearly political. From this perspective, it is 
demanded that public servants not be ‘passively unjust’ and instead act 
to prevent or alleviate the consequences (Shklar 1990: 56). If we give 
a voice to the victims of governmental inertia, like in New Orleans, 
Bhopal or Naples, we are going to assign a political function to the sense 
of injustice: what began as a natural disaster was, in its full effects, a 
public injustice (Shklar 1990: 3). This claim implies a solidaristic view 
of the community in which each individual has a moral responsibility 
towards the other in order to avoid passive injustice, the refusal of both 
officials and private citizens to prevent acts of wrongdoing when they 
could and should do so (Shklar 1990: 5).
This is exactly the case of the toxic waste affair in and around 
Naples. During the whole period of criminal activity, public institutions 
completely failed to assure control of the territory in order to avoid 
the environmental and health disaster. But in the complex social 
structures in the zones controlled by criminal forces and camorra clans, 
many citizens were involved, at least as ‘passively unjust’ according to 
their negligence, or their conspiracy of silence. The very idea of public 
injustice helps us to consider that in the whole process there has been 
a collective denial of the catastrophe (Ross Meyer 2007: 22), without 
considering the consequences that were going to affect the whole 
community, and without making any distinction between victims 
and executioners. The transformation of the crisis into an emergency 
where legal responsibility was weakened time after time caused a loss of 
faith in law and institutions by the affected people. The victims’ group, 
whose numbers reached one million people (Iacuelli 2008: 275), was 
condemned to having their feelings of injustice ignored as a result of 
the legal and social negation of the catastrophe. The belief was widely 
held that no one was able to defend them from such aggression, due to 
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the incapacity of public institutions to set up a framework of prevention 
and control of criminal activities in their territory.
Understanding the implication of the assumption that catastrophes 
are both jurisgenerative and a negation of the law at the same time 
(Douglas et al 2007: 4) involves trying to combine these two elements 
in the analysis. The idea of a state of exception captures both concepts 
well. The link between states of exception and catastrophes has been 
recently discussed by Beck, who argued that dealing with catastrophic 
risks means being aware of a planetary state of exception that cannot be 
afforded at a national level (Beck 2009: 76). He argued that risk is the 
anticipation of catastrophe, but in order to have an idea of the meaning 
of the global dimension of the catastrophe we need to question the 
staging of the catastrophe, which fills the gap between the anticipated 
catastrophe and the actual one (Beck 2009: 10, 67). It is the symbolic 
dimension that transforms a local event into a cosmopolitan and global 
one. The global media coverage helps to assign a common meaning to 
the sense of catastrophe, as has happened with terrorist attacks. In this 
way, the catastrophe has meaning for us; it can capture our attention 
even if it has happened far from us. The staging of the catastrophe also 
underlines another dimension: the fact that by coming into existence 
it reminds us of the effective representation of what we tried to avoid 
just by assigning it a risk. Understanding catastrophe is possible only 
through its staging, exactly because, with the coming of modernity, 
we removed the very idea of the occurrence of the catastrophe (Dupuy 
2002).
The aesthetic that results from the catastrophe is a powerful 
threat to the authority and reputation of the State. The staging of the 
catastrophe casts a vigorous light on legal failures and inefficiencies. 
Crime scenes can play different roles with regard to this aspect. They 
can be the representation of an order to be re-established — as in the 
case of Katrina — with vulnerable people targeted as criminals, giving 
the opportunity to picture law and legal order as a means to come out 
of the catastrophe, denying the role they played in its creation. They 
can tragically show for a long period the effects that negligence and 
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the absence of prevention caused, having the function of a perpetual 
reminder of inflicted pain, as in the Bhopal case. Or they can, as in 
the Naples case, be the representation of a prolonged and unresolved 
crime scene that, with its perpetual scandal, is a powerful threat to 
legal legitimacy and thus must be removed and hidden from the public 
sphere.
While Beck’s approach to the link between catastrophe and state of 
exception through the staging of the catastrophe is a cosmopolitan one, 
there is no need to hold his cosmopolitan view to affirm the spreading 
of the state of exception. According to Agamben, the state of exception 
has been replaced by a generalisation of the paradigm of security as the 
normal technique of government in Western societies (Agamben 2005: 
14). In Agamben’s view, the role of the nation state is still powerful 
in determining the extension of the law, and for this reason it is more 
useful in understanding what the staging of the catastrophe means for 
legal structures. The crucial role played by criminal law in the making 
of a state of exception during a catastrophe can be well exemplified by 
the fate of many detainees in the aftermath of Katrina. Most of them 
were left without any legal assistance for weeks, as they were moved 
from jail to jail around the zone affected by the hurricane. As a study 
reports, many of them would not have been in prison if only they had 
not been deprived of legal assistance (Metzger 2007).
Focusing now on the Neapolitan affair, we are able to explore an 
example of the theoretical category of ‘state of exception’ in real life. 
What renders it really similar to a permanent state of exception is, 
first of all, the legal framework that governed the territory affected by 
the garbage emergency. The exercise of emergency powers exploited, 
on a legal basis, the local bodies of any administrative competence on 
subjects that were under their control. Little by little, writ after writ, a 
large part of the Campania region was governed by a law that citizens 
could not participate in, as the administrative forms of individuals’ 
participation in the decision-making procedure were suspended, 
together with an enormous body of legislation of primary importance 
to the Italian legal system (see Legge n.123 2008 section 18). At the 
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same time, for the purpose of removing garbage from the streets, 
dangerous waste of industrial or pharmaceutical origin was stored in 
the same dump as urban and normal garbage, deviating from national, 
and probably EC, laws (Legge n. 123 2008 section 9).
This state of things also affected the judicial organisation: a 
unique jurisdiction of the Naples court became competent to try all 
criminal cases regarding violation of laws for waste treatment in the 
whole region of Campania (Legge n. 123 2008 section 3); and with 
specific crimes only punishable in the area, achieving the result of 
an unprecedented fragmentation of the penal law (Legge n. 210 2008 
section 6). The representation of a state of exception is well exemplified 
by the government’s decision to use military forces to patrol and keep 
under surveillance the sites chosen to host the dumps managed under 
the exceptional laws mentioned above. The presence of military forces 
serves as the visualisation of State power in the eyes of the community, 
with the aim of deterring grass-roots movements from demonstrating 
and protesting. With this body of rules, the state of exception became 
the way the law reaffirmed its pretence of order and control, even 
against itself, as the suspension of the law must be necessary for the 
common good.
This is, of course, the institutional side of the state of exception. 
Here it is not possible to deal, for example, with the complex system of 
intimidation, fear, and corruption by which the camorra dominates the 
local population, imposing its business and often killing the resistant. 
What the toxic waste affair shows in the relationship between the state 
of exception and the crime scenes caused by catastrophes is that the 
moral meaning of a catastrophe cannot be fully understood without 
taking into serious account how the legal system and its structure react 
against the stress of harmful events, intentional or unintentional as 
they may be.
As we have seen, legal institutions are always connected to the 
making of a catastrophe. This view challenges the traditional and 
established view of law as a primary means to assure order. The hard 
question to answer here is whether it is possible that law contributes to 
129
Catastrophes as Crime Scenes
disorder and irresponsibility, rather than order and responsibility. In 
his last thought-provoking book, Scott Veitch has argued precisely this 
point: that the legal system can be (legally) involved in the production 
of irresponsibility (Veitch 2007: 3). Veitch lucidly shows that the rise of 
the division of labour in organising responsibility within multiple roles 
and institutions has irresponsibility as the overall effect of these features 
and their proliferation (Veitch 2007: 49). The Neapolitan case shows 
how this theoretical framework can find an empirical confirmation 
in a particular legal system, even a civil law one. In this sense, law 
just becomes a way of organising irresponsibilities and legitimising 
immunities (Veitch 2007: 72). The law has therefore the privilege to 
define its peculiar epistemological status, carrying with it the danger 
of auto-referentiality. If it is the law itself that establishes that the law 
has been suspended and that it is possible to act against the law during 
this time, in a kind of anomy, this is the state of exception at work. 
However, Veitch’s insights also point towards another theme, the way 
law organises the legitimatisation of suffering. One of the ways in which 
law can do this is by legalising the catastrophe. If a nuclear winter and 
the use of nuclear weapons able to exterminate humanity is allowed by 
international law, it is not particularly shocking anymore what national 
states do to face the threat of catastrophes (Veitch 2007: 121).
Conclusion
In concluding, let us come back to the cause of the Naples catastrophe. 
As Bauman has noted, modernity has a strong conceptual link with 
the concept of waste. We eventually produce waste, as it is the end of 
all economic processes on which capitalist society is grounded. But 
together with this, there is the production of human wastes, those 
that are out of any social order. While the production of human wastes 
is continuous, the dumps are, day after day, getting fuller: the world 
seems to be full (Bauman 2004). Humanity is fated not to understand 
the moral meaning of the catastrophe until it is understood that, when 
evil exceeds certain limits, trying to describe it with the language of 
natural catastrophe is just senseless (Dupuy 2005). Catastrophes are, 
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in the end, just another expression of the Promethean gap between 
humanity and the world of its products (Anders 2003). The aesthetic 
and symbolic dimensions in which the catastrophe performs its mise 
en scène is a way to reduce such a gap. Catastrophes emerge as large 
crime scenes in which law tries to claim control, in constant struggle 
between the break of order and its reaffirmation. The State still seems 
to be the main arbiter of such a fight. Looking at catastrophes as crime 
scenes is a promising direction to enlighten such a role.
Notes
 The author wishes to thank Patrícia Branco, Rebecca Scott Bray, Gianvito 
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and useful conversations, Angelo Ferrillo for the photo reproduced in 
the article. I am grateful to the anonymous referees who made excellent 
comments and criticisms that helped to improve this article. A very special 
thanks to Richard Mohr for his encouragement in pursuing this work. A 
first version of this article was presented at the Research Committee on 
Sociology of Law Annual Meeting in Milan, July 2008.
1 For example, the Lisbon Earthquake was, for a long time, interpreted by 
religious bodies as the divine revenge of an angry God.
2 Author’s translation.
3 Posner holds this argument but forces it to some debatable consequences, 
such as absolutising cost-benefit.
4 For a dramatic account of how this method of reasoning could lead to a 
total privatisation of risk with private companies offering an all-inclusive 
deluxe evacuation package see Sedersky 2006 ‘Hurricane victims can 
evacuate in style’ The Nation 19 September <http://www.usatoday.com/
travel/flights/2006-09-18-hurricane-evacuation-style_x.htm>.
5 This is the case, for example, of the evacuation plan for Vesuvius’s possible 
volcanic eruption (potentially affecting more than 1.5 million people): it 
took many years to have a plan but the effective efficacy is dubious also 
due to the lack of in-depth knowledge among the population.
6 For a dramatic account of the story of the Acerra sheep and their shepherds, 
the Cannavacciuolo family, see the movie Biùtiful Cauntri 2007.
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7 An impressive account of the fires with ample video coverage of the 
situation can be found in the media activist website <www.laterradeifuochi.
it>, where it is possible to see many videos that can explain the situation 
better than words. The site aims at making documents available for a public 
denunciation of the state of affairs.
8 At the time this article was written, the trial was still in progress.
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